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Abstract
Investors play an important role by spending their money in the capital market.
Without investors, the stock market do trade securities trading. In choosing a
company, investors will evaluate the best condition of the company. So the aim of this
research is to investigate whether the agency cost and earning management will give
an impact to financial distress. The research object is the company listed in Indonesian
Capital Market from 2012 to 2016. The regression analysis used to test the hypothesis
was applied only to the final sample of 22 firms at the end of the sample period from
2012 to 2016. This study used the Modified Jones Model to measure discretionary
accruals as earning management. And the dependent variables Z-score served as
substitutes for financial distress. The hypothesis was tested using a regression model.
The first independent variable operating expense ratio as substitutes the agency cost
has a negative significant on financial distress. The smaller amount of agency cost will
impact the Z-score to increase. This showed that if the Z-score is higher, it will mean
that the company is in the area of no financial distress. Then, the second variable
earning management has negative relationship but insignificant on financial distress.
Keywords: agency cost, earning management, financial distress
1. Introduction
Capital Markets should be efficient which help investors to evaluate every listed com-
pany. Investors play an important role by spending their money in the capital market.
Without investors, the stock market cannot trade securities trading.
Recently, there have been an increasing in the amount of investors in Indonesia.
According to PT Kustodian Sentral Efek Indonesia, the number of investors in the
Indonesian capital market rose 25.24% by the end of 2017 compared to the end of
2016. (CNN Indonesia, 2017). In doing the investment, every investor should bear the
risk of their investment decision as the balance of getting a return so that investors
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desperately need the financial information of the company as a material to analyze
the level of future profits that will be obtained from the investment will be done.
The information disclosed in the financial statement use by investor to make their
own decision. Therefore, managers are obliged to provide information about the com-
pany’s condition to the investors. The information submitted by managers sometimes
does notmatch the actual company conditions becausemanagers tend to report some-
thing to maximizes their utility. This is known as information asymmetry that can give
managers an opportunity to practice earnings management (Richardson, 1998). The
earningmanagement that intentionally created bymanagers will eradicate the reliabil-
ity and quality of the financial information. According to Decow and Skinner (2000), the
most powerful tools to manage earnings are discretionary accruals. However, GAAP
allows certain discretion in making choices and estimates in determining accruals basis
accounting.
Consequently, investors will be misled about the company’s economic performance
by this earning management practice [5]. Investors who have chosen failed company
will suffer more severe losses than those of company just having poor performances
so that detection of earning management in the years preceding bankruptcy becomes
important. Bankruptcy usually begins with the situation where a company face finan-
cial distress. Financial distress is a condition when the company is unable to cope with
the debt holder’s obligation. A company under financial distress can incur costs related
to the situation, such as more expensive financing. There are two interest groups in a
company which each group has its own goals. These groups consist of principal and
agent. Agency costs are a type of internal cost that arises from, or must be paid to, an
agent acting on behalf of a principal. These costs arise because of core problems, such
as conflict of interest between shareholders and management. Shareholders wish for
management to run the company in a way that increases shareholders value, while
management may wish to grow the company in ways that maximize their personal
power and wealth that may not be in the best interests of shareholders. Based on a
disagreement between management and shareholders as to what actions are in the
best interest of the business, agency costs result. Agency costs include any expense
that is associated with managing the relationship and resolving differing priorities.
2. Literature Review
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2.1. Financial distress
Financial distress in enterprises has long been an issue of concern to governments
and the investing public. A significant and persistent decline in a company’s financial
performancemay eventually result in insolvency, making investors and creditors suffer
considerable financial loss.
The Altman z score is used to predict the likelihood of a businesswill get into financial
distress. The formula is based on information found in the income statement and
balance sheet of an organization; as such, it can be readily derived from commonly
available information. Given the ease with which the required information can be
found, the z score is a useful metric for an outsider such as investor who has access to
a company’s financial statements. In its original form, the z score formula is as follows:
𝑍 = 0.012𝑥1 + 0.014𝑥2 + 0.033𝑥3 + 0.006𝑥4 + 0.999𝑥5. (1)
Where
X1 = working capital/total assets,
X2 = retained earnings/total assets,
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets,
X4 = market value equity/book value of total liabilities,
X5 = sales/total assets, and
Z = overall index
The rules is that the lower the score, the higher the odds are that a company is
headed for bankruptcy. A z-score of lower than 1.8, in particular, indicates that the
company is heading for bankruptcy. Companies with scores above 3 are unlikely to
enter bankruptcy. Scores in between 1.8 and 3 lie in a gray area.
2.2. Agency cost
According to the theory of the relationship between principals (owners) and agents
(managers) – principal–agent theory – owners hires managers to run the firm on their
behalf. The social and private costs of an agent’s action due to incomplete alignment
of the agent’s and owner’s interests were brought to attention by the seminal con-
tributions of Jensen and mackling (1976) on agency costs. Agency costs are a kind of
transaction costs connected with way in which a firm is organized. Agency costs are
real costs which depend on legal regulations and the willingness of people to sign
contracts, among others. They are always present in all companies and at every level
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of management and, as pointed out earlier, are always borne by current shareholders
([9], p. 891). The purpose of incurring them is to assure that managers will act in the
capital suppliers’ best interests. The measurement of agency costs was still depending
on proxy variables. According to literature, there were seven proxy variables sug-
gested to measure agency costs: they are total asset turnover [1]; Singh and Davidson
(2003), operating expense to sales ratio [1], administrative expense to sales ratio;
Singh and Davidson (2003), earnings volatility, advertising and r & d expense to sales
ratio, floatation cost [9]. Therefore, Wang (2010), suggest that operating expense ratio
is all the expense that relate to the company operation.




Earningsmanagement has been defined inmany differentways: for example, for Healy
and Wahlen (1999), earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either
mislead stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company
or otherwise to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting
numbers.
To capture managers’ earnings management behavior, this research use measures
of discretionary accruals as calculated by the modified jones model. The definition of
accruals (ACC) as the difference between net income (NI) and operating cash flows
(OCF) and estimate equation (1) below for all firms in each year to derive the non-
discretionary component of total accruals (NDA).
ACC𝑡 = 𝛼0(1/Assets𝑡−1) + 𝛼1(ΔSales𝑡 − ΔDebtors𝑡) + 𝛼2PPE𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (3)
Where, Δsales is the change in operating revenue from t–1 to year t, Δdebtors is the
change in debtors from year t–1 to year t and ppe is property, plant and equipment. DA
is the residual from equation (3), that is, DA= ACC – NDA. [4]
3. Research Method
Our basic approach is to identify firms which likely to become financially troubled in
periods of research. This research use secondary data, which consist of the financial
statement component of 22 companies, were collected from Indonesian Capital Market
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period 2012–2016. The analysis will be covered into descriptive analysis and regression
analysis. For regression analysis, the random are effects taken into consideration.
The model was proposed in this research which financial distress will predicted by
Agency Cost and Earning Management. In a mathematical expression, it may state:
𝑌1 𝑍𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽2 𝑂𝐸𝑅 + + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑀 𝜀 (4)
Whereas, Z-Score = Financial Distress
OER = Operating Expense Ratio as substitutes of Agency Cost
EM = Earning Management
4. Result
T 1: Descriptive analysis.
Z_SCORE EM OER
Mean 2.839047 0.037993 0.114158
Median 2.631079 0.009736 0.071716
Maximum 9.273589 2.906904 0.429978
Minimum 0.714509 –0.244799 0.013491
Std. Dev. 1.383009 0.259091 0.109270
Skewness 1.514174 10.38354 1.662627
Kurtosis 6.609285 115.6738 4.630316
Jarque-Bera 122.0881 72196.59 75.43383
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Sum 374.7542 5.015029 15.06882
Sum Sq. Dev. 250.5655 8.793776 1.564120
Observations 132 132 132
Source: Author’s calculation (2018).
From Table 1 show the result of financial distress proxy by Z-Score for this research
that the maximum Z-Score 9.273589, the minimum Z-Score is 0.714509. It showed that
there are still some companies tend to head to have financial distress if it based on
the Z-score evaluation. Based on Z-Scores said that companies with score above 3
are unlikely headed to bankruptcy. However, mostly of the companies listed are in
the healthy condition with Z score 0.714509. Earning management that exist in the
listed company in Indonesia has maximum EM 2.906904, the minimum EM –0.244799.
there is no single company that does not do earning management but in different way.
Finally, it’s the Operating Expense Ratio show that the listed company in Indonesia has
a maximum value of 0.429978 and the minimum value is 0.013491.
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 3.277337 0.168701 19.42687 0.0000
EM –0.317021 0.448343 –0.707096 0.4808
OER –3.733828 1.063072 –3.512302 0.0006
R-squared 0.090104 Mean dependent var. S.D. dependent











Log likelihood –223.3685 3.456449
F-statistic 6.387224 0.537093
Prob(F-statistic) 0.002264
Source: Author’s calculation (2018).
Based on the random-model regression, we can formulate that
𝑍 − 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = 3.277337 − −3.733828𝑂𝐸𝑅 − −0.317021𝐸𝑀.
As themultiple regression analysis reveals that Operating Expense Ratio has a negative
significant impact on financial distress Z-Score represent by probability < 0.05. The
standard coefficient of operating expense ratio is –3.733828 and t-statistic –3.512302.
It means that for every unit increase of OER will decrease Z-Score by –3.733828. Fur-
thermore, the result shows that there is no significant relationship between earning
management and financial distress Z-Score. It shows by probability of earning man-
agement p = 0.4808 > 0.05. In order to test the hypothesis, the general rule is that if
that p-value < 0.05 reject H0 and if p-value > 0.05 reject H1.
5. Discussion
According to the empirical result, the meaningful level of dependent variable < 0.05
and the independent variable factor is negative, so it can concluded that Operating
Expense Ratio as the proxy of agency cost have a negative significant on Z-score
as the proxy of financial distress. It means if agency cost increasing, it will decrease
the Z-score. On the contrary, If the agency cost decrease, it will increase the Z-score.
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The smaller of the amount of agency cost will impact the Z-score to be increase.
This showed if the Z-score higher, it will means that the company is in the area
no financial distress. This explain by Companies with scores above 3 are unlikely to
enter bankruptcy. The result of second variable earning management have a negative
impact on financial distress but not significant. It can said statistically that in term
of decreasing earning management will increase financial distress but statically not
significant. This research finding is partly support by the research of Qin (2017). Qin
suggests that distress risk has more influence on earning management in companies
that previously had positive earnings management. It means, if earning management
of the company is positive or company do increase earnings management then
company tends to decreasing earning management in the time of financial distress.
As well the empirical result of Howe (2016), Habib et al. (2012) find that companies
that experiencing distress will tend to manage earning upward.
6. Conclusion
This study examined the characteristics of earning management and agency cost by
operating expense ratio and aimed to discover whether these variables have a sig-
nificant relationship with the probability of companies get into financial distress. This
empirical research was conducted using a sample of firms in Indonesian Capital Market
from 2012 to 2016. The regression analysis used to test the hypothesis was applied
only to the final sample of 22 firms at the end of the sample period from 2012 to 2016.
This study used the Modified Jones Model to measure discretionary accruals. And the
dependent variables Z-Score served as substitutes for financial distress. The hypoth-
esis was tested using a regression model. The first independent variable operating
expense ratio as substitutes the agency cost has a negative significant on financial
distress. This result suggest that the smaller agency cost then Z-score greater meaning
if the index of z-score is increasing means that the company included in the category
of companies that do not tends to financial distress. As the agency cost has a nega-
tive significant on financial distress, investors should use the indicator of agency cost
that is operating expense ratio to detect early signs of financial distress and take a
precautions action in choosing the company for their investment.
Then, the second variable earning management has no relationship on financial
distress. This result reveals that even if the company done upward and downward
in managing the companies’ earning, it would not cause the companies directly enter
to the financial distress. Earning management slightly can be interpret as management
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behavior in maintain the company health. Although, there is no relationship between
earning management and financial distress, it is suggested to the investors and finan-
cial analyst to pay attention to the management behavior of earning management.
They should be sure whether the level of earning management in those companies is
less than riskier to drag the company into financial distress. It is suggested to stock
exchange authority and regulatory bodies to increase its attention in reducing the
intended earning management.
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